The South Korean land reform was a compensated redistribution of land in the spring of 1950. In conjunction with the uncompensated confiscation of the March 1946 North Korean land reform, the two land reforms eliminated the long-standing landlord system and were a watershed moment in creating different agricultural and economic systems in the two Koreas. Many previous studies have discussed the background, process, and results of the South Korean land reform. This paper argues that the South Korean land reform was not only intended to eliminate the large landlord class, but was a policy package that combined government purchase of land, the transformation of landlords into capitalists, and the sale of land recovered from the Japanese. In this respect, the land reform was a large landlord-centered modernization project that aimed at giving them a soft landing by transforming the landlord class into commercial and industrial capitalists. In addition, this paper examines how the large landlord-centered policy of transferring capital from agriculture to industry was affected by the Korean War and hyperinflation. Finally, this paper discusses how the removal of large landlords from the countryside and their migration to the cities after the land reform influenced the rural power structure, the political consciousness of farmers, agricultural productivity, and the political base of the Syngman Rhee government in the 1950s.
Introduction
In the spring of 1950, the South Korean government carried out a land reform program in which it limited landlords from owning more than three jeongbo 1 of land. The government purchased any land in excess of that amount and sold it to tenant farmers and landless agricultural laborers. To compensate landlords, the South Korean government first provided land bonds. A land's value was pegged at 150 percent of its average annual crop yield, but the landlords were paid in 30 percent installments annually for five years, which the government paid in cash at the government-set price. As for the farmers who purchased the land, they paid the government in kind, which allowed the government to profit from rising prices.
The total area of distributed farmland reached 580,000 jeongbo, including some 270,000 jeongbo of restituted farmland (recovered from Japanese owners). Considering that the total area of South Korean farmland at the end of 1945 was 2,300,000 jeongbo, with 1,450,000 jeongbo of tenanted land, the redistributed land comprised around 26 percent of all farmland and 40 percent of tenanted land in the country. By the time of the land reform in 1950, the amount of tenanted land in the country had been significantly reduced since liberation in 1945 because landlords had sold large amounts of land before the reform was carried out. According to one estimate, some 710,000 jeongbo was sold in this fashion. The proportion of self-cultivated farmland in South Korea increased sharply from around 35 percent at the end of 1945 to 96 percent in 1951 after the land reform. Through land reform, the landlord system in South Korea collapsed and was replaced by a system of mass self-cultivation.
The South Korean land reform took place contemporaneously with the Korean War, which began on June 25, 1950. Like the North Korean land reform program, which, however, did not compensate landlords in its redistribution of land, the South Korean land reform was a landmark event that destroyed the landlord system in South Korea, replacing it with a new agricultural and economic system. A number of studies have taught us much about the South Korean land reform, its background, process, and accomplishments (Jang 1984 (Jang , 1985 Kim et al. 1989; Hong 1992; Yi 1994; Hong, ed. 2001; Ha 2010) . Building on this earlier body of research, I aim to focus in this paper on the activities of large landlords within the context of the South Korean land reform. The land reform was implemented with the goal of 1. A jeongbo is a unit of land measurement (1 jeongbo = 0.992 ha.) eliminating the large landlord class through the redistribution of land, but it was also a modernization project intended to transform landlords into commercial and industrial capitalists and businessmen.
A Modernization Project Centered on Large Landlords
As a modernization project, the South Korean land reform was implemented as a package that encapsulated a number of policy goals, such as compensating landlords for confiscated land, transforming landlords into capitalists, and selling vested properties, such as former Japanese companies, to landlords. In this respect, the South Korean land reform was more similar to the case of Taiwan than that of Japan; Japanese land reforms did not seek to change landlords into capitalists. The Taiwanese land reform began in January 1953, three years after that of South Korea. The Taiwanese government purchased land at a price set at 250 percent of the land's average annual crop yield, and 70 percent of the total compensation was given via land bonds that made payments in kind over the next ten years, while the remaining 30 percent was immediately given as stock shares in four public Taiwanese companies. These four public Taiwanese companies were the conglomerates formed by reorganizing former Japanese companies in Taiwan. These four public conglomerates included the Taiwan Cement Corporation (four companies), Taiwan Pulp & Paper Corporation (six companies), Taiwan Industry and Mining Corporation (163 companies), and Taiwan Agriculture & Forestry Corporation (forty-five companies). The Taiwanese government paved the way for landlords to become large stockholders or managers of those public companies, as well as to become small-to-medium capitalists and entrepreneurs, by taking over smaller companies that were subsumed by the aforementioned conglomerates. Through such measures, the Taiwanese government successfully carried out land reform without much landlord resistance, all the while privatizing public companies and thereby bowing to American pressure to adopt a free capitalist economic system (Liu 1974, 80-89, 205; Wu 2005, 90-93) . Land reform became a dominant trend in East Asia in the postwar era. The Japanese government first legislated for land reform with compensation at the end of 1945, and North Korea launched its land reform, without landlord compensation, in March of 1946. The U.S. military government and public opinion in South Korea also viewed land reform as inevitable. In this regard, three options eventually emerged in South Korea: the land reform plan from the political right, which provided for compensation to the landlords and required tenants to purchase those lands, the political left's plan of confiscation without compensation followed by free redistribution, and the centrist position of compensating landlords while redistributing the land for free. In the end, the rightist plan won out.
The logic of South Korean land reform, the party line of the Korean Democratic Party from early 1946, was clear: in order to establish a new state, modernization, industrialization, and commercial development were absolutely necessary, but the problem was that there were not enough resources. The only resources the new state could tap into were landlords' land and former Japanese properties (especially companies). Therefore, the land reform had to compensate landlords so that those landlords could then channel the compensated capital into commerce and industry. The sale of ex-Japanese companies in South Korea also had to work in accord with this logic (Yi 1994, 9-13; Kim 2000, 483-484; Sin 2001; Kim 2001, 141-143) .
However, those who were to be transformed into commercial and industrial capitalists were the country's large landlords, a category that did not include the vast majority of landlords in South Korea. Table 1 shows the class distribution of 169,803 landlords who were compensated by the South Korean land reform. One notes that 84.25 percent of the aforementioned landlords were small landlords who received compensation of fifty seok 2 of unhulled rice or less (in terms of surface, 2.2 jeongbo or smaller). compensation for landlords who were compensated for 50 seok of unhulled rice. Category (1) shows the annual compensation the landlords were expected to receive in equivalent value for ten seok annually for five years; (2) is the average daily wage of a construction worker for the given year; (3) is (1) divided by (2). For example, the number twenty-eight in the first line indicates that the amount of compensation that particular landlord received in 1951 (1,481 hwan) equaled the average total wages of a laborer over twenty-eight days in the same year. Looking at Tables 1 and 2 , one can discern that it was impossible for most landlords to become commercial or industrial capitalists by such compensation. In other words, the South Korean land reform was designed to transform a small minority of landlords-the country's large landlords-into capitalists and entrepreneurs. Of course, the vast majority of landlords who could not make the transformation were the true victims of South Korean land reform, and the South Korean Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry sympathized with them (Kim 1950, 61 (Joseon 1947). As will be discussed later, the number of large landlords dropped due to the division of property among family members and selling of land prior to the land reform. At this time, the aforementioned bank categorized "large landlord" as one who held land with annual yield of 500 seok or more. The number of large landlords at the time of liberation in 1945 probably was closer to the 1943 number. What kind of people were these landlords? According to previous research on the landlord system, landlords in colonial Korea were not simply landlords-they were landlords-cum-capitalists. Today, we cannot imagine businessmen who do not use banks for financing. The same was true for the above mentioned Korean landlords under Japanese colonial rule. The largest landlords used government banks, such as the Joseon Industrial Bank, while smaller landlords used ordinary banks, and even smaller landlords used credit unions to borrow money (using credit, land, and crops as security) to expand their holdings, improve and reclaim land, and control the date of their rice shipments (Hong 1989, 70-76) .
3 These landlords, of course, developed cozy relationships with the banks as well as with the colonial authorities that controlled them. The large landlords adjusted asset allocations in their own portfolios as they saw fit, and they also ventured into other industries. Some even established new companies and became involved in their management. They also focused on their children's education, managing the educational transition from high culture based on literary Chinese to the one based on Japanese. Within the bounds established by the Japanese colonial state, landlords also became involved in politics in both the capital and local regions through participation in such government bodies as the Privy Council (Jungchuwon ) and provincial assemblies. Large landlords, in particular, were most active in these areas (Jang 1989, 236; Hong 2005, 184) .
The banks provided the landlords with both opportunities and risks. Successful investments with bank loans could result in fortunes made and the expansion of businesses. However, landlords could also make faulty investments and suffer tremendous losses. Some cases even resulted in bankruptcy, a trend that became much worse during periods of economic downturn, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Joseon Industrial Bank, for example, even established a daughter company called Seongeopsa in order to manage the sudden influx of repossessed lands when a number of landlords filed for bankruptcy during the Great Depression (Hong 1990, 130) . Large landlords, therefore, had to actively manage production, distribution, marketing and financing for the sake of their survival. This was even more the case for those with larger land and business holdings that relied more heavily on banks. In short, these landlords were active, entrepreneurial landlords. Of course, many landlords did not take this route and just passively collected tenant rent. Towards the end of Japanese colonial rule, however, more and more pressure was exerted on the landlords by the colonial state to improve the productivity of their lands. The colonial state even ordered some lands owned by absentee landlords to be managed by agricultural and industrial associations in order to forcibly increase productivity (Hong 2005, 194-195) . After Korea's liberation from Japanese rule, as the voices for economic democratization became louder, large landlords found themselves under siege for their monopoly on land holding as well as for their former collusion with the Japanese authorities. However, things gradually stabilized for the landlords with the establishment of the U.S. military government in the South. Their investments in education had paid off, and these landlords were well-aware of the geopolitical developments in and surrounding Korea, U.S. policy toward Korea, and the historical roots of the left-right conflict. They also easily made the transition from the Japanese speaking generation to the English speaking one. Due to their local and national networks established during the colonial period, they were rich in personal resources and speedily acquired valuable information. Large landlords quickly adjusted to post-liberation political institutions and elections because they had been political candidates or participated in elections at all levels, including for the provincial assemblies, during the colonial period. Also, seasoned in dealing with various class disputes with tenants during the Japanese colonial period, they were well-equipped to deal with similar issues following liberation.
Large landlords also had a number of potential allies nationwide. These included lesser landlords and absentee landlords whose lands were about to be redistributed by the land reform, urban merchants and industrialists who were also landowners, economic organizations in the capital (such as the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry) and elsewhere whose ranks were filled with such landlords and industrialists, various banks who had done business with the landlords over the years, as well as other financial institutions and companies that invested in land and agriculture. Influential journalists, academics, and critics that believed in capitalism and private property dominated the media and were also sympathetic to the country's large landlords. The Korean Democratic Party, which was supported by landlords, was also influential. The United States government, the mecca of capitalist political and economic thought, was also in control in the immediate postliberation years (Hong 2001, 185) . Collectively, these figures and organizations argued for a land reform program that included owner compensation as well as a program to transform landlords into merchants and industrialists and to make them the beneficiaries of redistributed Japanese companies.
Preemptive Sale of Land by Large Landlords before the Land Reform
Large landlords were aware immediately upon national liberation that land reform was going to take place. In response, they sought various solutions, such as the partitioning of their land holdings among family members, converting their land to non-agricultural purposes, and establishing educational foundations. Of course, the most common response was to sell off land holdings. How did they do this? Earlier scholars have argued that the landlords, using their privileged positions as landlords, sold their land before the land reform at prices that were higher than market prices and those prices set by the government at the time the land reform took place (Jeong 1967, 103-104; Hwang 1982, 83) . Such perspectives played a role in generating a widely negative impression of the South Korean land reform. Later, scholars argued that the landlords sold their land at substantially lowered prices due to the impending land reform. Furthermore, according to these scholars, the bulk of sales also took place in 1948 and 1949, immediately before the land reform took place (Gwon 1984, 197; Jang 1984, 268, 272) . Such perspectives generated a positive impression of the land reform, as this wave of selling of the land at discounted prices could also be seen an accomplishment of the South Korean land reform. It was not easy for the large landlords to decide when and how to sell their lands. The political instability and inflation of the immediate post-liberation period did not result in many opportunities for investment with capital from the sale of land, nor was simply holding on to the money a likely solution. Yet, the landlords had to seriously consider selling their land. If the land reform were to be implemented in the near future with conditions unfavorable to the landlords, then they would not be able to sell their land even if they so desired. But if they preemptively sold their land at a cheap price because they expected an unfavorable land reform and it then turned out the terms of reform were not that unfavorable, they would be faced with a loss. With the possibility of loss at every turn, possessing land itself became a cause of resentment. Despite these conditions, the large landlords gathered information through every possible means and based their individual decisions on when and at what price to sell their land according to the best possible information.
Diagram 1 above derives from the land sale records at Donggo Farm, located in Hwasun-gun, Dongbok-myeon, in Jeollanam-do, where land sale contracts amounting to 1,961 durak 4 of land were signed between liberation in 1945 and June 1950. Two things are notable here. First, some 52 percent of the total 1,961 durak was sold between January and May of 1946, and another 33 percent was sold between November 1947 and March 1948. In other words, over 80 percent of total land sales took place during the two brief periods mentioned above. Second, of these two periods, the first (January to May of 1946) matches the period surrounding the launching of the North Korean land reform in March 1946, while the second (November 1947 to March 1948 matches the period surrounding the submission of the South Korean land 4. A durak is a unit of area. It is defined differently across regions but it is roughly equivalent to 0.066 ha.
Source: Hong (1992, 388) . "Deposit-only Amount" (the upper of the two lines) refers to land for which a deposit had been paid but the full balance was not yet paid. "Fully Paid Amount" (the lower of the two lines) refers to land that had been paid off in full. The former is a better indication of the landlord's willingness to quickly sell the land. In sum, the two periods when the land sales peaked were when land reform appeared most likely to be implemented. Table 3 is based on the same data from the Donggo Farm, and it shows the prices at which the lands were sold. Reflecting inflation, nominal price (1) increased substantially over time. The real price (2), however, did not rise as much. Category (3) is the real price of one durak of paddy expressed as a percentage of that one durak's annual yield.
Two things are noticeable here. First, during the period between January and May of 1946, the price of one durak of land was set around 83 percent of the annual yield. However, during the period between November 1947 and March 1948, the price was set at a much higher rate of 179 percent of annual yield. During the period when the North Korean land reform, without any compensation to the landlords, took off, landlords in the south sold their land at a cheaper price out of fear. After that period, however, the lands were not sold at such bargain prices. The second point is that land sales during a seventh period (December 1949 to March 1950 stood at around 166 percent of their annual yield. By that time, the compensation rate of 150 percent had been announced, and land sales were taking place just a bit above the 150 percent that landlords could expect to be compensated through the land reform. In other words, with the official compensation rate set, there was no reason for sellers to sell at anything below 150 percent, or for buyers to purchase at a price Source: Hong (1992, 406-407) . (2) = (1) / unhulled rice price of one seok. *The won was the standard unit of Korean currency until the currency reform of February 1953, when it was replaced by the hwan (1 hwan = 100 won).
much higher than 150 percent. Large landlords converted the money they obtained from preemptive land sales into business capital. For example, from the Japanese colonial period Gu Inhoe, the founder of LG Group, had operated a linen shop named Guinsanghoe in Jinju, Gyeongsangnam-do. After liberation, Gu sold some of his land holdings and used that money to establish a trading company called Joseon Heungeopsa in November 1945. Later, Gu sold Guinsanghoe and some more of his land in Goseong, Gyeongsangnam-do. In January 1947, he used the capital from these sales to establish Lak-Hui Chemical-Industrial Corporation (Rakhui Hwahak Gongeopsa), which became the mother company of today's LG (Kim 1991, 349) . The Gyeongju Yi family also became founding stockholders in the Goryeo Fire and Marine Insurance Company (Goryeo Hwajae Haesang Boheom) at the end of 1947 and a few family members became directors of the company in 1950 (Bak 1987 . Another example is the Haenam Yun family, which purchased a rice mill with the money they received from land sales in 1948 (Choe 1990, 894-900) .
Landlords used their land sale money as lending capital as well. As evidenced by the informal loan interest rates in Dongbok-myeon, Hwasun-gun in Jeollanam-do (the most common annual rate was 36.5 percent in 1946, 91.3 percent in 1947, and 91.3 percent in 1948), interest rates in rural areas around this time were extremely high (Hong 1992, 376) . While the real interest rate at times remained in the negative due to extremely high inflation rates at the time, lending was an important method for landlords looking to preserve the value of their money during a time lacking in many investment opportunities.
Capital Conversion and Differentiation of Large Landlords
Land reform was carried out in four stages: distribution of farmland, redemption of land, landlord compensation, and transfer of registration. The most critical step, of course, was the distribution of land. The question of timing-whether it took place before or after the Korean War-was once an issue of contention. It appears, however, that the land was distributed by April 1950, when official notifications of the land distribution schedule were sent out to the peasants (Kim 2001, 158-160; Ha 2010, 170-171) .
The second and third steps, redemption and landlords compensation, did not go as planned due to the Korean War. In particular, programs for land bonds, landlord compensation, and transformation of landlord into capitalists were greatly disrupted due to the administrative chaos that resulted from evacuations as well as increased government spending in wartime, increased printing of money, and hyperinflation. As mentioned earlier, the biggest economic problem of the immediate post-liberation era was inflation. The war made this much worse. Reflecting this, the nominal rate of interest skyrocketed after the war, and this was particularly extreme in rural areas. Interest rates for informal loans in Dongbok-myeon, Hwasun-gun in Jeollanam-do between 1952 and 1956 ranged from monthly rates of 7.7 to 25 percent, with 15 percent as the most common rate (Hong 1992, 442-443) . Calculated annually, those rates are extremely high-92, 300, and 180 percent, respectively. Given the interest rates, the values of land bonds, already marked below face value, plummeted. Combined with the uncertainties and risks of wartime, their values dropped even further.
When the United States, using aid as leverage, started to pressure the South Korean government to get its inflation under control, in early 1950 the South Korean government began pushing an economic policy that prioritized suppressing inflation, a policy that was strengthened with the start of the Korean War. In the course of these efforts, the original policy regarding the transformation of landlord into capitalist also underwent change. This was true in at least two aspects (Yi 1994, 40, 48-49; Hong 2001, 209-212) .
First, starting in 1951 (the first year of landlord compensations), the South Korean government did not provide the lump-sum compensation it had originally promised to do by May of each year. The government also occasionally delayed or changed the method of compensation to a system of monthly payments, and tightly restrained the loan program it had originally created to encourage the transformation of the landlords into capitalists. The steps mentioned above were taken out of fear that any sudden influx of money (i.e., lump-sum compensations and loans) into the market might make the inflation even worse. Such policy changes were a big blow to the landlords who were looking to become capitalists. Unable to maintain livelihoods, some landlords even started to sell their bonds at 30, 40, up to 70 percent of their face value. 5 Confronted with the prospect of land capital being "wasted" as 5. The face value of a land bond was calculated, in the market, by multiplying the amount remaining to be compensated by the government-set price for the previous year (Hong 1992, 437-439) . For example, the face value of a five-year land bond scheduled to receive one seok each year for the remaining two years until its maturity is 3,611.2 hwan, which can be calculated by multiplying two seok by the government-set (in May 1953) price of 1,805.6 hwan per one seok. The discount rate of a land bond went up when the expected rate of inflation was high, government-set prices were expected to be low and unlikely to be distributed on time, and the further the time of purchase was from the next round of compensation (May of the following year). If someone sold their land bond at around 30 living expenses and consumption funds, the South Korean government had to come up with an alternative plan in order to divert that money (as originally planned) as a resource for modernization, industrialization, and commercial development. Second, in response to the development mentioned above, in June 1951 the South Korean government allowed the purchasers of former Japanese companies to pay with land bonds issued under someone else's name. At the same time, the South Korean government also decided to recognize all such land bonds at their face value if the bonds were used to purchase former Japanese properties. The South Korean government originally intended to make the owners of the land bonds, that is to say, the landlords, the only ones allowed to use the bonds to purchase restituted properties. This policy was now changed. The South Korean government now allowed landlords to muster capital as well as living expenses by selling their land bonds, and non-landlords who purchased the land bonds were now able to buy former Japanese companies. Through such measures, the South Korean government sought to reduce the fiscal deficit and stimulate industrial and commercial development. With the formation of a market for land bonds, brokerage firms sprang up to cater to it. Due to wartime hyperinflation and other conditions, the South Korean policy of transforming landlords into industrial capitalists was changed into one of using land bonds for industrial investment.
Differentiation also began to emerge among the large landlords. Some became active industrial and commercial capitalists by selling their land and then using the land bonds. For them, the more difficult task (relative to being compensated for their land) was purchasing former Japanese companies from the government. They used all channels to gather information and lobbied to obtain greater compensation for their lands. They also used the capital they accumulated through selling land and using land bonds to make new investments or purchase former Japanese companies from the government. For example, Kim Yeonsu of Gyeongseong Spinning and Weaving Company (Gyeongseong Bangjik) and Samyangsa, the largest Korean landlord and capitalist of the immediate post-liberation era, used the capital he amassed from selling his land bonds at 30, 40 percent to 70 percent of their remaining value to build a sugar refinery in Ulsan (Sudang 1996, 277-278) . Bak Seungjik, the percent of face value in August 1953, the discount rate (r) was roughly 137 percent [1,805.6(1+1)0.3 = 1,805.6/(1+r) + 1.805.6/(1+r) 2 ], and the rate would be 91 percent if sold at 40 percent of face value. That was slightly lower than the annual informal loan rate (the mode 180 percent, the lowest 96 percent) around Hwasun-gun in Jeollanam-do (Hong 1992, 442) .
founder of Dusan (Doosan) Group, was a major Korean stockholder of the former Japanese company Showa Kirin Beer (Sohwa Girin Maekju). After liberation his son Bak Dubyeong became the administrator of the company and eventually purchased the company in 1952, using the land bonds under his father's name to pay the 10 percent deposit. Bak Dubyeong paid the balance with land bonds purchased at around 30 percent of face value (Bak 1996, 123) . Choe Jonggeon, the founder of SK Group, became an administrator of the former Japanese company Sunkyoung Textile Company (Seongyeong Jikmul) following liberation, and eventually purchased the company in partnership with a Suwon landlord named Cha Cheolsun. The two used Cha's land bonds to make the deposit toward the purchase (Jeon 1993, 143-145, 166-171) . Kim Yongju and Baek Nakseung, major landlords and capitalists from the colonial period, received the former Japanese companies Jeonnam Spinning and Weaving Company (Jeonnam Bangjik) and Taechang Spinning and Weaving Company (Taechang Bangjik), respectively. They also must have utilized land bonds for their purchases. As for other examples, the aforementioned Hwasun's Donggo Farm also purchased a rice mill located in Hampyeong, Jeollanam-do and started a transportation business. Yi Buyeong, a large landlord of Jeonju, co-purchased Jeonju Spinning and Weaving Company (Jeonju Bangjik) in a similar manner (Hong 2001, 213) .
On the other hand, a significant number of large landlords failed to make the transition. Such large landlords, along with other smaller landlords, ended up selling their land bonds at cheap prices under the shock of wartime hyperinflation. As a result, a number of others were able to cheaply purchase the aforementioned land bonds at discount prices and use them to purchase former Japanese companies. For example, Kim Jonghui, the founder of Hanhwa Group, used cheaply purchased land bonds to partly pay for the purchase of the former Japanese company Korea Explosives, Inc. (Joseon Hwayak Gongpan) (Jeon 1988, 212) . In fact, during the 1950s, over half of the total purchases of former Japanese companies were paid for with land bonds. This fact demonstrates that the original policy of transforming large landlords into industrial capitalists became a policy of using land bonds for industrial development.
What then was the proportion of landlords who made the transition and became commercial and industrial capitalists? While more systematic research is needed, Yi Jisu's work on Jeollanam-do and Jeollabuk-do landlords may provide some indications. Yi Jisu's work shows that out of 418 landlords from the two provinces with more than twenty jeongbo of land seized and redistributed, forty-seven (around 11 percent) made the transition and became capitalists. The success rate was higher for landlords with larger holdings, landlords who had a business-like approach to managing their lands, and those who had experience in the business world (Yi 1994, 65-66, 73) . The rate climbs to 19 percent for those with fifty jeongbo or more land, and climbs yet further to 25 percent for those with 100 jeongbo or more of land. Even within the large landlord class, the larger the landlord, the more successfully they made the transition to capitalists.
The Dismantlement of the Large Landlord Class and Rural Society
The South Korean land reform was carried out in conjunction with the Korean War-a civil, political, and ideological conflict. It therefore brought great changes to the power structure, ideologies, and facets of everyday life in the rural communities of South Korea. First, many large landlords and their families left the countryside amidst the war and land reform. Such war and upheaval not only inflicted great human and material damage, but the completion of land reform meant they no longer had any real reason to remain in the countryside. In addition to their education and prior experience of urban life, they also acquired capital from land sales and land bonds to be able to permanently move to the cities. Kim (1982, 171) has argued that in 1962, 51 percent of major capitalists, 36 percent of politicians, 34 percent of national cabinet members, and 29 percent of college professors were the children of large landlords. In other words, they comprised the core of the power elite of South Korea. A significant number of these must have numbered among those who transitioned to the cities around the time of the land reform.
The land reform and the dismantling of the large landlord class and the relocation of that class to the cities brought two major changes to rural communities. First, a major change appeared in the composition of the local elite. In the 1950s, while a significant number of former landlords who had accumulated administrative experience as local administrators during the Japanese colonial period continued in their roles as leaders in the rural communities, a significant number of new faces also replaced those who had left the countryside for the cities (Hong 1992, 323; Choe 1998, 175; Kim 2005, 283) . Among these, a significant number of new leaders in the rural areas were among those involved in anti-communist activities and who possessed combat experience. In this way, the land reform and war transformed the power structure of rural societies.
Related to this change, significant anti-landlord and anti-communist sentiments can be detected in the rural communities of the 1950s. The following document, sent down by the ruling Liberal Party's Hwasun-gun branch to the Dongbok-myeon branch to be widely printed and publicized around the time of the 1956 presidential and vice-presidential election, shows how the Syngman Rhee regime sought to take advantage of such sentiments in the rural areas:
Exposing the exploitative spirit of Democratic Party landlords. "We will return agricultural lands to the previous landlords," said Chairman Eom of the Gwangyang Democratic Party. In Jeollanam-do, the birthplace of the Democratic Party, a Don Quixote-like local party chairman of the Democratic Party appeared and enraged the people in the province by stating the land reform would be overturned and the land would be returned to each landlord... According to an appeal filed with the central authorities on the 27th, chairman Eom Sangseop of the local Gwangyang-gun branch of the Jeollanam-do Democratic Party visited the myeon offices and met with local community leaders. He made the outrageous statement that if the Democratic Party candidates won the election, then the previous land reform would be overturned and the land would be returned to each landlord. At the same time, he threatened anyone supporting the ruling party that those who collaborated during the Korean War and their families would have their collaboration completely exposed and they would face capital punishment. As the regular people of the countryside were stricken by fear, the local leaders resolved to appeal to the central authorities and they went to Seoul. (Jayudang 1956) The Liberal Party frightened farmers by telling them that if the Democratic Party gained power they would invalidate the land reform and put to death all wartime collaborators and their families. In response to the Democratic Party's election slogan, "I cannot live, let's change," the Liberal Party put forth the following slogan:
Hey you, You are greedy for money, so you can't live? You are hungry for power, so you can't live? You were the ones who were living well in the past You were the ones who used your power to make the people weep You miss the Japanese rule, so you can't live? You long for the U.S. military rule, so you can't live? You were the landlords during the colonial period You were the high officials during the American occupation. The Liberal Party created anxiety by equating the Progressive Party with the Communist Party and the Reds and stated that if the Progressives rose to power, they would implement radical communist policies. What the Syngman Rhee regime was propagating was that the Democratic Party in power might reverse the land reform, while the Progressive Party in power may take away the land that farmers received from the land reform. As can be seen from the election results-the ruling Liberal Party won in the countryside and the opposition parties won in the cities-such a strategy appears to have worked in the countryside. Many farmers in the 1950s possessed a sense of being petit bourgeois with their lands, along with having strong anti-communist and antilandlord sentiments. Such sentiments appear to have continued into the 1960s. Second, the dismantling of the large landlord class and their relocation to the cities left open the question of who was going to fill their production functions in the countryside. In the past, the landlords were the ones who had transmitted the Government General's agricultural policy, attempted land improvement, encouraged the increase of agricultural productivity, provided loans, implanted a capitalistic mindset and urban culture, and headed major regional projects (Joseon 1946, 9-10). There were two solutions. One was for the government to create cooperatives in the rural communities and use them to meet such responsibilities. The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Jo Bongam's plans for an agricultural cooperative union, the Minister of Planning Yi Suntak's plans for an agricultural union and farmland credit union, the Director of Farmland Gang Jinguk's designs for a national agricultural bank and agricultural cooperative union are examples of such plans (Bang 2010, 89) . Another solution would be for farmers to take on such roles themselves. Tenants of Seongeopsa Sudong Farm, located in Ongjin-gun, Hwanghae-do just south of the 38 th parallel, for example, formed a farmer's union in September 1945 and successfully managed the plantation on their own (Hong 1991, 155-159) . Such an example shows the promise of the second solution. However, the South Korean government chose neither of these options. While the government did divide up the lands and redistribute them to the farmers, it could not replace the productive role the landlord had played in the rural communities.
One of the key goals of land reform was the improvement of agricultural productivity (the first clause of the land reform bill). Thus far, a number of studies have touched upon the question of agricultural productivity in the land reform. Kang and Ramachandran (1999, 793) used vast panel data to estimate an agricultural production function in the Japanese colonial period and showed the positive correlation between tenancy rate and productivity. Given this correlation, what is implied in their work is that the land reform and attendant drop in tenancy rate would have resulted in a decrease in agricultural productivity. On the other hand, Jeon and Kim (2000, 265) argued for the negative correlation between tenancy rate and productivity using time series data. Jeon and Kim argued that land reform helped to increase productivity. U (2001, 205) examined the same question by comparing production in areas that had low tenancy rates with areas with high tenancy rates before and after the reform. His comparison of productivity before and after the land reform in twenty-four counties of Gyeongsangbuk-do did not show the negative correlation between tenancy rate and productivity.
Those who believed that land reform would positively stimulate agricultural productivity based their belief on the assumption that landlords (i.e., their tenants) did not care about the land and farming as much as independent farmers. However, large landlords of the Japanese colonial period were not passive. While exceptions existed, a great number of them played critical administrative roles in agriculture, involving themselves in production, distribution and marketing. They also played roles in improving the land and providing loans to do the necessary work on the land. Kang and Ramachandran (1999) and U (2001) show that the contributions landlords made to the land were not any less than those made by independent farmers. The South Korean land reform overlooked this in its formulation. While the land reform did divide up the landlords' land holdings and redistribute them, it did not come up with anything to take over the productive role the landlords had played, and this continued to be a burden on the development of agriculture in South Korea.
Conclusion
The South Korean land reform packaged into a single policy the purchase of land with compensation, the transformation of landlords into capitalists, and the distribution of former Japanese companies. In this aspect, the South Korean land reform was different from the cases of North Korea and China, which did not compensate the landlords, as well as that of Japan, which did not include a policy for transforming landlords into capitalists. Amassing of capital was absolutely necessary for modernization, industrialization, and commercial development. For South Korea, the land capital and former Japanese companies were the only two sources it could tap into to create such capital, and it therefore compensated landlords for the seizure of their land so that landlords could use that compensation to become capitalists. However, those who were actually able to make the transition were large landlords who acquired sufficient amount of compensation to enter the business world. Questions of its success aside, the South Korean land reform constituted a modernization project designed to transform landlords into capitalists, with a focus on large landlords.
The Taiwanese land reform, like the case of South Korea, also packaged together landlord compensation, the transformation of landlords into capitalists, and the distribution of former Japanese companies. However, the Taiwanese government provided 70 percent of the compensation in kind over ten years, while providing the remaining 30 percent as stock shares in four major companies. Through such measures, a greater proportion of Taiwanese landlords were able to make the transition, despite high inflation. In South Korea, however, compensations were paid in cash at the government-set price over five years, the Korean War and hyperinflation notwithstanding, but even these were often not paid on time. The government policy for transforming large landlords into capitalists retreated markedly as well.
Through the land reform, landlords quickly became differentiated. Some used the money that received from the sale of their land and land bonds to expand their business ventures. Kim Yeonsu of Gyeongseong Bangjik and Samyangsa, Gu Inhoe of LG Group, Bak Dubyeong of Doosan Group, Choe Jonghyeon of the SK Group and his business partner Cha Cheolsun of Suwon are examples of figures who successfully made the transition. On the other hand, small to medium sized landlords with smaller compensations, and even large landlords in many cases, "wasted away" their compensations by selling land bonds at cheap prices without ever making the transition. The land bonds that were sold at bargain prices by these landlords were then purchased by the likes of Kim Jonghui, the founder of Hanhwa Group, and were used to help purchase former Japanese companies. The government policy of transforming large landlords eventually morphed into a policy of turning land bonds into industrial capital.
The land reform, carried out amidst civil war, brought significant changes to rural communities throughout South Korea. With the relocation of large landlords to the cities, new rural elites emerged to replace them in the countryside. The petit bourgeois consciousness of the independent farmers throughout the countryside generated anti-landlord as well as anti-communist sentiments in the rural areas, and the ruling Liberal Party took advantage of such sentiments for their political gain.
A key goal of the South Korean land reform was increasing agricultural productivity. While the South Korean government did divide up and redistribute land to the tillers, it failed to find any substitute for the landlords in terms of the productive role they had filled in managing and improving the productivity of their lands. In this sense, the land reform did not become agrarian reform, and even after the reform shortcomings continued to burden South Korean agriculture.
